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The purpose of this article is to explore the impact of internal and external market conditions on bank 
holding company operating expenses.  An agency problem exists whenever management makes 
decisions which produce results contrary to shareholder interests.  Factors such as large-block 
shareholdings, management participation in ownership, product and labor market competition, 
outsider board participation and ease of market entry are believed to serve as mitigating factors.  
Although there is evidence that product and ownership conditions have a significant effect operating 
expenses and other expenditures deemed to be preferred by management, there is scant evidence on 
the importance of these factors relative to board composition and entry barrier regulation.  
Furthermore, most of the focus has been on relatively large banking institutions.  Employing a sample 
of small-to-medium banking firms from the 1980s, the results indicate that entry barrier regulation 
and board composition served as an important source of agency problems for these firms as reflected 
in the operating expense structure. 
 





he impact of governance and control conditions on the performance and behavior of firms has been 
studied for some time.  Some of this agency-theoretic research involves tests of the expense-
preference hypothesis, which purports that certain internal and external control conditions, such as 
diffusely-held shares, insufficient outsider board participation, non-competitive markets, and the reduced threat of 
takeover, to name a few, hamper the decision-control process between shareholders and managers by providing 
incentives which ultimately lead to the attenuation of owner control over firm expenses. 
 
 High diffusion of voting shares increases the cost to owners of effectively supervising and scrutinizing 
executive decision-making.  Heightened executive board participation and the attainment of key board positions by 
executives encumbers outside directors in their attempt to devise and implement share-price maximizing policies.  
Non-competitive effects stemming from concentrated product markets or regulatory entry barriers enhance free cash 
flow for all firms in the market and, presumably, executive discretion over cash flow.  Assuming that the market for 
managerial talent is competitive and fully-functioning
1
, one would expect higher managerially-preferred expenses 
from firms subject to each or any of these conditions relative to their presumably more disciplined counterparts.   
 
 This paper examines the relative impact of ownership structure, board composition, government regulation 
and product market structure on bank operating expenses during the Glass-Steagall era.  Employing a nationwide 
sample of small-to-medium sized bank-holding companies, the results indicate that agency effects are not evenly 
distributed across the structure of expenses and that board composition and geographic branching restrictions, 
neglected factors in much of the prior research, play an important role relative to ownership and product market 
                                                     
     1Fama (1980) contends that a fully functioning internal and external market for managerial labor should provide sufficient 
discipline to extinguish the agency premium embedded in expenses.  However, circumstances such as asymmetric information or 
the inability to evaluate the productivity of individual managers may leave the ex post settling up process incomplete. 
T 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – November, 2009 Volume 7, Number 11 
20 
structure in the determination of bank expenses.  The next section is a brief overview of the empirical research on 




 Although there is evidence suggesting that ownership structure and product market concentration 
meaningfully influence bank input utilization and operating expenses, there are a number of studies which contest 
this.  In addition, there has been relatively little research on the impact of executive board participation on bank 
expense-taking.
2
 Employing deposit market concentration to proxy non-competitive effects, Edwards (1977), using 
aggregate banking market data, and Hannan (1979) using individual bank data, found higher bank employment and 
personnel expenses in non-competitive markets.  There have subsequently been studies identifying non-competitive 
effects on non-personnel expenses as well (Hannan and Mavinga (1980), Glassman and Rhoades (1980), James 
(1984) and Rose (1992)).  Hannan and Mavinga (1980) find that share diffusion produces lower personnel and non-
personnel expenses, while Glassman and Rhoades (1979) obtain this result for non-personnel expenses only.  
Brickley and James (1987) find that salary expenditures are lower for banks in non-acquisition states with either 
high outside board participation or concentrated share holdings.  Pi and Timme (1992) find lower cost efficiency for 
banks in which the CEO is the Chairman of the Board and that efficiency is positively related to CEO ownership for 
Nonchairman-CEO banks; however, they find no agency effects for either large-block ownership concentration or 
insider board representation.  Berger and Hannan (1998) find that concentrated shareholdings and competitive 
markets promote bank cost efficiency.  Akella and Greenbaum (1988) find evidence of expense-preference behavior 
in the savings and loan associations during 1979-1980; Gropper and Hudson (2003) corroborate this finding for the 
same time period and also find diminished expense-preference behavior and increased managerial efficiency during 
the succeeding period of deregulation and heightened competition. However, there are also a number of studies 
which find little or no evidence of non-competitive effects.  Glassman and Rhoades (1980) and Rose (1992) find that 
banks in more concentrated product markets do not have higher personnel expenses. Smirlock and Marshall (1983) 
assert that differences in bank input utilization are better explained by organizational complexity rather than product 
market structure.  Other studies in this vein include Rhoades (1980) and Scott, Gardner and Mills (1988).  In 
general, the evidence on the relative importance of non-competitive, ownership, board and entry barrier effects 






The following model accounts for those factors which may influence the decision-control process and, as a 
result, the level of bank operating expenses, or those expenditures deemed to be preferred by executives.  Assuming 
imperfections in the market for managerial services, or that the market for those services is fully-functioning and 
frictionless but insufficient to completely extinguish agency effects, expenses are a function of i) firm size ii) output 
heterogeneity iii) the cost of labor, capital, land and premises iv) non-price factors effecting final product demand v) 
product market concentration vi) regulatory entry barriers vii) ownership structure and vii) board composition. 
 
 The size of the banking organization is probably the most important factor in determining expenses.  Larger 
banking organizations have a greater volume of transactions to conduct, requiring greater utilization of inputs.  In 
addition, these organizations are often characterized by layered decision-making with complicated operating 
strategies, making it particularly difficult for shareholders to supervise and control.  So, from a volume of 
transactions perspective as well as a governance perspective, larger firms should generate higher expenses.   
 
 Banking firms have differences in asset and liability composition, production technologies and risk which 
can affect the expense structure.  Increases in the cost of production factors such as labor and land will prompt firms 
to reduce output and expenses.  Banks operating in markets characterized by a high demand for bank products and 
                                                     
     2The focus here is on institutions primarily involved in commercial banking.  For evidence on the savings and loan industry 
see Verbrugge and Jahera (1981), Simpson and Kohers (1980) and Blair and Placone (1988).  For evidence of expense-preference 
behavior for non-financials see Awx and Primeaux (1985). 
     3For instance, Glassman and Rhoades (1980) and Rose (1994) find that non-competitive effects are more prominent for non-
personnel expenses, such as premises and equipment expenses and miscellaneous expenses.  Rose (1994) identifies a negative 
coefficient on deposit concentration in his non-personnel expense equation, a result which is at odds with Edwards (1977).  
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services should have higher expenses.    
 
 The impact of product market structure on the demand for inputs and expenses and reflects both derived 
demand and organizational control considerations.  Reduced market competition and the consequent impact on final 
demand elasticity should lead to a reduction in industry output.  If market shares remain constant, the derived 
demand for labor for each firm will fall as well.  However, non-competitive effects may enable firms to increase 
input utilization and expenses beyond what is called for by the derived demand schedule.  If agency effects are 
present in non-competitive markets, and if the intensity to engage in agency-theoretic behavior is identical across 
banks (holding the bank's ownership and board structure constant), then one would expect to observe higher 
expenses in concentrated product markets.   
 
 Agency effects may also be present in markets protected from the threat of entry or expansion by 
government regulation.  Rules prohibiting branching or interstate banking may stifle market competition, since they 
reduce the number of banks with access to the market and, thereby, the threat of entry and expansion to all 
participants.  This assumes that regulatory authorities do not compensate by expanding the number of banking firms 
in the market.  However, entry and expansion regulations may also drive market participants to adopt production 
technologies best suited to the regulatory policy in effect.   
 
 The ownership structure of the bank refers to both the concentration of share ownership and the degree of 
executive participation in ownership.  According to agency theory, firms with more concentrated share holdings 
maintain lower expenses, since their owners have a greater incentive to monitor corporate behavior and face a lower 
cost in enforcing share price maximizing policies.  Furthermore, the incentive of executives to limit expenses 
increases the higher their proportionate share holdings relative to other investors and relative to the their own total 
wealth.  Evidence of agency-theoretic behavior exists if more concentrated share holdings or greater executive stock 
participation is associated with lower expenses.  We would accept the null hypothesis and reject the presence of 
agency-theoretic effects if no relationship can be identified between principal or executive ownership and bank input 
utilization and expenses. 
 
 Although there is evidence that outsider representation on the board of directors has been increasing, very 
few regulations mandating board size, composition or committee structure and function exist
4
.  Insiders possess 
important specific information and expertise regarding corporate activities and operations; their direct involvement 
should facilitate the planning process and lead to more efficient corporate behavior.
5
 However, this "expertise 
effect" does not completely account for the motivations of insiders.  Insiders could use their heightened influence 
over strategic decision-making to indulge their proclivities for higher expenses.
6
  So whether expertise or agency 




 Assuming that the cost of capital and the rental price of premises are constant across banking markets, the 
model below is based on the theoretical discussion in the methodology section and is used in the regression 
estimations which follow: 
 
 
(1) EXP = f(Total deposits, Bank offices, Net loans-to-securities, Per capita income, Wage rate, Deposit 
concentration, Limited branching restrictions, Statewide branching, Interstate activity restrictions, Principal 
ownership, CEO ownership, Board insider participation, Board Chair is the CEO) 
 
in which EXP refers to the three operating expenses of the holding company under observation, total salaries and 
benefits (SAL), furniture and equipment expenses (FEE) and net occupancy expenses and ln refers to the natural log.  
                                                     
     4 see Baysinger and Butler (1985), Brickley and James (1987) and John and Senbet (1998). 
     5see Fama and Jensen (1983). 
     6Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) find that outsiders are more likely to join boards and insiders more likely to exit after a firm 
performs poorly, suggesting the presence of agency effects. 
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It is assumed that if expense-preference and agency effects are present that they are likely to appear in the operating 
expense structure.  However, it is unlikely that these effects are equally distributed across expenses.  The greater the 
scrutiny that an expense undergoes by the investing public or the more accountable management is for a particular 
expense, the lower the likelihood that management will use that expense as a vehicle for agency-theoretic behavior.  
It is asserted here that personnel expenses, such as salaries and benefits, are held to greater public scrutiny and that 
executives are more accountable for excesses in these expenses as opposed to non-personnel expenses, such as 
office furnishings or occupancy expenses.  However, if managers derive more utility from personnel expenses as 
opposed to non-personnel expenses, then their incentive to indulge in personnel expenses is greater.  Since there is 
no way of determining a priori which category of bank expenses is more subject to agency-theoretic behavior, each 
is entered into separate estimations.   
 
 Total deposits measure the size of the banking firm.  The number of banking offices and the net loans-to-
investment securities ratio for the banking firm are entered to capture output heterogeneity effects regarding capital 
investment and portfolio composition.  Larger banking organizations with more offices are expected to conduct a 
greater number of transactions and operating activities.   The net loans-to-securities ratio is included to correct for 
output differences between banking firms.  Since lending is assumed to be a relatively risky activity requiring 
greater investment of labor, equipment and space, one would expect banks that have a relatively larger fraction of 
their assets in loans as opposed to securities to maintain higher operating expenses.   
 
 The per-capita income of the banking market is intended to capture demand-side effects on bank output.  
The banking market is defined as the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) or county if there is no MSA in which the 
banking firm derives its largest proportion of deposits.  Markets which have higher per-capita income are more 
prosperous and demand more banking transactions and services; therefore, banks operating in these markets are 
expected to generate higher expenses. 
 
 Wage rate refers to the manufacturing wage rate for that state in which the banking firm is headquartered 
and proxies the market cost of labor.  Manufacturing wage rates are used since rates based on banking or financial 
services employees may be contaminated by agency-theoretic behavior.  Higher wage rates should encourage banks 
to reduce input usage. 
 
 Deposit concentration is designed to measure the degree of product market competition while limited 
branching restrictions, statewide branching regulations and interstate activity restrictions account for the impact of 
geographic branching and expansion limitations on bank expense-taking.  Deposit concentration is measured by the 
continuous three-firm bank deposit concentration ratio in that market from which the bank holding company 
maintains its greatest deposit presence.  Geographic branching and expansion regulations are represented by dummy 
variables, with limited branching = 1 if the banking firm is headquartered in a limited branching state, statewide 
branching = 1 if in a statewide branching state and the no interstate activity dummy = 1 if the banking firm is located 
in a state prohibiting interstate banking activity, 0 otherwise.  
 
 If managerial-entrenchment effects are present, banks located in concentrated deposit markets should have 
higher expenses.  Banks located in states without entry and access restrictions, such as limited or statewide 
branching states and states which maintain interstate banking laws, should have lower expenses than their more 
protected counterparts. 
 
 Principal ownership is the percentage of stock beneficially held by the largest principal shareholder and 
CEO ownership is the percentage of stock owned by the CEO.  If agency effects transmitted through share diffusion 
and executive ownership are present, both should be negatively related to expenses. 
 
 Finally, two board composition variables are entered into the estimations - insider participation, or the 
percentage of current or former executives of the bank holding company on the board of directors and CBD=CEO, a 
binary variable = 1 if the CEO also serves as the Chairman of the Board, 0 otherwise.  If insider participation works 
to create more informative and decisive boards, then negative signs on these variables are expected.  However, if 
insiders serve to encumber the ability of board outsiders to supervise and discipline corporate behavior, then positive 
sign coefficients are expected.  If sign coefficients on all the agency-theoretic variables are not significantly different 
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from 0, we would then reject the alternative hypothesis and accept the null hypothesis that ownership and board 
structure have no meaningful expense-preference ramifications. 
 
SAMPLE AND DATA 
 
 The sample consists of 127 bank holding companies in 1986.  These firms were drawn from a randomly-
selected larger pool of 222 bank-holding companies in which the lead bank is state-chartered and a member of the 
Federal Reserve System.  Banking firms were rejected from the initial pool if insufficient data was obtained.   
 
 Definitions of dependent and explanatory variables appear on table 1, and sample means and standard 
deviations appear on table 2.  The average sample holding company has total consolidated assets of $484 million, 
with a range of $2.654 billion to $19.94 million.  The sample is dominated by smaller banking firms, with 86 firms 
(67.7%) having total assets less than $500 million and with 43 (33.9%) maintaining total assets of less than $150 
million.  Alternatively, 20 firms (15.7%) have total assets greater than $1 billion.   
 
 Although the 41 banking firms with more than $500 million in total assets maintain a lower ratio of net 
loans-to-investment securities (3.46 versus 7.70), the two sets of firms have relatively equivalent largest principal 
ownership shares (10.74% versus 10.85%) and deposit concentration ratios (58.5% for the 41 largest versus 60.8%).  
Insiders are more likely to serve on the board for the larger holding companies (24.9% versus 19.7%) and the CEO 
is more likely to be Chairman of the Board (48.8% versus 27.9%).  Approximately 26% of the banking firms are 







 All regression estimates regarding total salaries and benefits (SAL), furniture and equipment expenses 
(FEE) and net occupancy expenses (OCC) appear in table 3.  With the exception of the binary variables (limited 
branching, statewide branching, no interstate activity and Board chair=CEO) all other variables are entered into the 
regressions in natural logs (ln).  The R
2
's for all three equations range from  
85% for SAL to 76% for OCC and FEE, indicating that the model accounts for a sizeable portion of the variation.   
 
 Regarding the agency-theoretic variables, board structure has a greater impact on expenses than either 
ownership or product market structure.  Insider board participation posted positive and highly significant 
coefficients in all three estimations.  The size of the coefficient in FEE and OCC reveals that insiders have greater 
influence over those expenses rather than SAL.  In addition, CEO-Chairman firms generate higher expenses in all 
categories relative to CEO-Non-chairman firms; however, the effect is statistically significant only in the SAL 
equation.   
 
 The percentage of large-block share holdings and CEO ownership produced the expected negative sign but 
failed to be statistically significant.  However, these effects may be present amongst only the larger banks in the 
sample.  To capture this, Principal Ownership INT and CEO Ownership INT are interactive variables entered into 
the estimations accounting for shareholder control effects.  Principal Ownership Int is equal to principal 
ownership*INT, in which INT is a dummy variable = 1 if the banking firm's total consolidated assets are greater 
than $500 million, 0 otherwise.  The CEO interactive variable is constructed in an identical fashion.  This ownership 
specification provides negative and statistically significant results on the principal ownership variable but the CEO 
ownership variable, indicating that more concentrated principal share holdings tend to reduce expenses.  However, 
this effect is only observed for the larger banking firms, but the size of the parameter is relatively small.   
 
                                                     
     7 Data on expenses, total deposits, net loans and investment securities is obtained from the firm's annual report.  The data used 
to construct the deposit concentration ratios as well as the number of branch banking offices and state branching status is 
obtained from FDIC Data Book: Summary of Deposits of All Commercial and Mutual Savings Banks.  The personal income data 
comes from the Survey of Current Business published by the U.S Department of Commerce.  Manufacturing wage rates are 
obtained from Employment and Earnings published by the U.S. Department of Labor.  All ownership and board structure data is 
obtained from proxy statements. 





Total salaries and benefits of the banking firm (SAL). 
Furniture and equipment expenses of the banking firm (FNE). 
Net occupancy expenses of the banking firm (OCC). 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Total deposits, the total consolidated deposits of the banking company. 
Number of banking offices of the banking company. 
Net loans-to-securities ratio of the banking company. 
Per-capita income of the banking market. 
Wage rate, or the hourly manufacturing wage rate in the state in which the holding company is headquartered. 
Deposit concentration equals the three-bank deposit concentration ratio for the banking market.  
Limited branching status binary variable, equal to 1 if the banking company is headquartered in a statewide banking state, 0 
otherwise. 
State branching status binary variable, equal to 1 if the banking company is in a statewide banking state, 0 otherwise. 
No Interstate activity binary variable, equal to 1 if the bank is located in a state which prohibits interstate banking activity (i.e., 
no nationwide or reciprocal banking arrangements), 0 otherwise. 
Principal ownership refers to the percentage of stock beneficially held by the largest large-block shareholder of the holding 
company.  
CEO Ownership refers to percentage of stock held by the CEO of the holding company. 
Insider participation, or the percentage of insiders on the board of directors, is equal to the number of current or former banking 
company executives serving on the board of directors of the holding company divided by total board membership. 
Board Chair=CEO binary variable is equal to 1 if the Chairman of the board of the holding company also serves as CEO or 





                                                    Standard    
  Variable                          Mean              Deviation           
  Total Salaries and Benefits (SAL)   $7,845,013  $8,795,746 
  Furniture and Equipment Expenses (FEE)                  $2,084,918         $5,662,776 
  Net Occupancy Expenses (OCC)   $1,484,875     $9,835,000 
  Total Assets              $483,558,107       $560,352,163 
  Total Deposits             $413,254,902       $467,831,631 
  Banking Offices       13.07              14.87 
  Net loans-to-investment securities                 6.34              10.51 
  Per-capita income                   $15,220             $3,611 
  Deposit Market Concentration             60.03%             18.36% 
  Limited Branching    25.98%      44.03% 
  Statewide Branching                  62.20%           48.68% 
  No interstate banking activity                           11.02%             31.44% 
  Principal Ownership                  10.81%             12.32% 
  CEO Ownership                         3.96%              7.20% 
  Insider Board Participation                      21.40%             16.23% 
  CEO is Chair of the Board (Board Chair=CEO)       34.65%             47.77% 
 
 
 The deposit concentration ratio generated the expected positive sign in all estimations, but was significant 
only in the FEE equation.  The limited and statewide branching status dummies produced negative and highly 
significant results; however, the results were not monotonic with respect to branching status, which is similar to 
what was obtained in Berger and Mester (1997).  Although banks in both limited and statewide branching states 
maintain lower operating expenses than banks in unit banking states, banks in limited banking states had lower costs 
than those in statewide branching states, an unanticipated result but on which was also obtained by Berger and 
Mester (1997).  Interstate banking restrictions do not have significant effects on bank expenses. 
                                                     
     8All figures refer to 1986 and to the full 127 observation sample, with the exception of FEE (101) and OCC (117).    




Determinants of Bank Holding Company Expenses 
                    Ln SAL  Ln FEE  Ln OCC 
Constant    2.987  2.539      -0.560  
    (1.60)  (0.644)  (0.218)  
Ln(Total Deposits)  0.357***  0.329***    0.393***  
    (7.16)  (4.43)  (5.81)  
Ln(Bank Offices)   0.520***    0.641***   0.428***  
    (9.53)  (7.39)  (5.70)  
Ln (Net Loans-to-   0.048  0.057   0.153** 
 Securities)     (1.07)  (0.79)  (2.51) 
Ln(Per Capita   0.449**  0.292   0.451*  
 Income)    (2.57)  (0.705)  (1.88)  
Ln(Wage Rate)   0.396  0.797   0.921*  
    (1.02)  (1.28)  (1.68) 
Ln(Deposit   0.195  0.577**   0.200  
 Concentration)   (1.27)  (2.21)  (0.96)  
Limited               -0.659***  -0.745***      -0.717*** 
 Branching Binary     (4.37)       (3.12)       (3.39) 
Statewide         -0.543***      -0.435      -0.441** 
 Branching Binary  (4.14)  (2.06)  (2.42)  
No Interstate   0.055      -0.038       0.290 
 Activity Binary   (0.42)       (0.16)          (1.56) 
Ln(Principal        -0.017**        -0.030**  -0.031***  
 Ownership Int)   (2.06)  (2.32)  (2.81)  
Ln(CEO    0.013       0.011  0.050 
 Ownership Int)   (0.28)       (0.16)          (0.82) 
Ln(Insider   0.178**        0.302***   0.217**  
 Participation)   (2.53)  (2.77)  (2.20)  
Board Chair-CEO  0.185**  0.029   0.099  
 Binary    (2.19)  (0.197)  (0.82)  
Adjusted R2   0.852        0.757    0.755  
F-statistic   56.77    24.95   28.54      
N      127    101     117   
 
 
 Regarding the remaining variables, both total deposits and banking offices provide the most powerful 
impact on expenses, with estimated coefficients in keeping with prior research.  Per-capita income has the expected 
positive effect on SAL and OCC, but is insignificant in the FEE equation.  The ratio of net loans-to-investment 
securities has a positive and significant effect on occupancy expenses but not labor expenses or furniture and 
equipment expenses.  The market wage rate provides statistically significant results only in the OCC equation, but 




This paper analyzes the impact of imperfections in the market for corporate control on the management of 
bank holding company expenses.  Using a sample of small-to-medium sized banking firms, the evidence indicates 
that board composition and state branching restrictions played a more important role for these institutions than 
product market or ownership structure.  The evidence failed to support the hypothesis that product market 
concentration has a meaningful influence throughout the structure of operating expenses and finds evidence of a 
large-block ownership effect, but only for the larger firms.  Finally, these agency effects were not evenly distributed 
                                                     
     9t-statistic in parentheses.  SAL = total salaries and benefits; FEE = furniture and equipment expenses and OCC = net 
occupancy expenses.  All F-stats are statistically significant at the 1% level.  Ln refers to the natural log of the variable.  N refers 
to the number of observations.  All data is from 1986.  *** = significant at the 1% level.  ** = significant at the 5% level.  * = 
significant at the 10% level. 
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